that the evidence was uncovered during an unconstitutional search and seizure and therefore must be suppressed. 8 In an opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that there is no per se requirement that an officer notify bus passengers of their right to refuse to cooperate with the officer's demands. 9 Instead, a situation's coerciveness must be examined by applying a totality-of-circumstances test, where the absence of a warning is just one factor for consideration.' 0 Justice Kennedy analyzed the specific bus search at issue using this standard, and found that the officers did not act in a coercive manner; therefore, they did not unconstitutionally seize the Respondents." The Court then addressed whether the suspicionless search was involuntary, and found that because the Respondents had not been seized, there was nothing to indicate that they were forced to consent to the search. 12 The Court therefore reversed and remanded the case. 13 Justice Souter, in a dissent joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, claimed that the circumstances surrounding the encounter did amount to an illegal seizure.' 4 The dissent found that the officers' actions were sufficiently coercive to convince the passengers that they were required to comply with the officers' demands; any consent the Respondents gave to the officers' search requests were therefore invalid.' 5 This Note argues that the totality-of-circumstances test which the Court uses to evaluate consensual bus searches is improper. These searches are similar to custodial interrogations, and just as individuals in those situations are afforded the protections of the bright-line Miranda warning, the Court should adopt a bright-line rule to apply to bus searches. A mandatory warning should be given to bus passengers before officers begin their search, notifying them of their constitutional right to refuse to cooperate with the officers. Such a rule would lead to more consistent court rulings, by removing the subjectivity that undermines the success of the totality-of-circumstances test. A warning would also take into account important factors which have been ignored by courts that have assessed the circumstances surrounding consensual bus searches. The impact that the warning would have on the officers' ability to detect drugs and weapons cases "searches conducted . . . without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment .... ."24
Despite this per se standard, two main exceptions have been carved out which allow officers to proceed with a search without probable cause and a warrant.
2 ' The first deviation from the general standard has been termed 'reasonable suspicion,' and was established by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio. 26 There, the Court distinguished limited seizures and searches from a "full-blown search for evidence of crime., 2 7 This lesser intrusion, called a "frisk," is a quick, limited search of a person's outer clothing, which may only be done when an officer "observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous .... ,, 28 The establishment of this second type of legitimate police intrusion was significant; for the first time, the Court was expanding "the range of encounters between the police and the citizen" that was held to be acceptable under the Fourth Amendment. 29 The second exception, consensual searches, further extended acceptable interactions between police and citizens by completely doing away with the need for any sort of suspicion at all. 30 This exception is based on the theory that "not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons., 31 A police officer has the right to approach any citizen and question that person. 32 If the person who is approached chooses to respond to the officer's questions and comply with the officer's requests, any search which then occurs does not require probable cause and a warrant. 3 3 There is only one requirement needed for such a search to be constitutional: the person approached must be "free to 24 Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. 25 See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 576 (1988); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) . Note that other exceptions to the probable cause and warrant requirements have been supported by the Supreme Court. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (exigent circumstances); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to lawful arrest); disregard the police presence and go about his business" without being detained or punished for doing so.34
B. DETERMINING VOLUNTARINESS IN CONSENT-BASED SEARCHES
Evidence uncovered during an unconstitutional search is generally suppressed and cannot be used at trial. 35 Therefore, in consensual searches, police officers must be certain to have valid permission from the citizens they question, and must be able to prove consent in the courtroom. 36 However, proving that a third person actually gave consent is difficult. 37 People who are arrested as a result of a consensual search will often later claim that they did not give permission. Also, many defendants who did give consent claim that such consent was given involuntarily because they were being questioned in a coercive environment where they were unable to avoid the police's questions. 38 The Court has chosen to determine when searches were truly consensual, and when the consent was the result of an illegal seizure, by using a "voluntariness" standard. 39 This standard was first clearly defined by the Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 40 In Schneckloth, a defendant was charged with "possessing a check with intent to defraud" after he was pulled over by a police officer because of burnt-out lights. 4 '
The defendant allowed the officers to search his car, but at trial claimed that his consent had been coerced. 42 The Court determined that, based on "the totality of all the surrounding circumstances," the defendant's consent was voluntary. 4 3 This totality-ofcircumstances standard considers whether a person's consent was "coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force. 44 The Government is not however required to prove that the defendant knew he 45 had the right to refuse to allow the police to search his car.
Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall each dissented separately in Schneckloth; all three challenged the Court's finding that it is unnecessary for citizens to know their Fourth Amendment rights 6 Marshall, in sentiments echoed by the other two dissenters, argued that a person's "consent cannot be considered a meaningful choice unless he knew that he could in fact exclude the police." 47 By finding consent in the face of such an omission of knowledge, the Court allows police to have "the continued ability ... to capitalize on the ignorance of citizens so as to accomplish by subterfuge what they could not achieve by relying only on the knowing relinquishment of constitutional rights.A 8 Similar cases following the Schneckloth decision relied on the totalityof-circumstances test that the Court created. 9 Eight years after Schneckloth, in Mendenhall, the Supreme Court refined the test by adding a new factor-the free-to-leave standard. 50 The Court concluded that "a person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment... if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. ' Such a situation only occurs when, "by means of physical force or a show of authority, [a citizen's] freedom of movement is restrained., 52 Once the citizen has been 'seized' by the police, any consent given is viewed as being "the product of duress or coercion," 53 and therefore is involuntary. 4 The Court in Mendenhall gave some general examples of coercion, 55 but later cases lay out in greater detail what 'shows of authority' are coercive to the point of making a reasonable person believe they were detained. 56 In Florida v. Royer, the Supreme Court held that police officers had "illegally detained" a person when they took his identification, told him 46 
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[Vol. 93 that he was suspected of "transporting narcotics," and brought him into a storage closet to be questioned by two officers. 57 The defendant testified that he did not believe that the officers would let him leave the room, and the State conceded that this was likely true. 58 Since the officers had no probable cause justifying the confinement, they had no right to put the defendant in that position. 59 Therefore, the officers' actions violated the free-to-leave test established in Mendenhall, and amounted to an illegal seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 60 The consent that this person gave when he was in the small room was "ineffective to justify the search,", 6 1 so any evidence collected in the search had to be suppressed. 62 The scope of what constitutes unconstitutional confinement was narrowed one year after Royer, in INS v. Delgado. 6 3 The respondents, workers at three factories, claimed that searches done at their workplaces by INS agents violated their Fourth Amendment rights. 64 They claimed that the "several" armed agents who entered the factories and positioned themselves next to all the exits 65 "created a psychological environment which made them reasonably afraid they were not free to leave." 66 However, the Court determined this was not a seizure because the respondents should not have been leaving the buildings anyway; whenever an employee is at his workplace, his "freedom to move about has been meaningfully restricted, not by the actions of law enforcement officials, but by [their] voluntary obligations to their employers." 67 Also, the workers were not actually confined because, as the search was conducted, they could continue going "about their ordinary business," and could move about within the factories. 68 This decision was not unanimous, and the two Justices who dissented in Schneckloth, Brennan and Marshall, felt that the situation in Delgado amounted to an unreasonable search. 69 They argued that the search occurred "under conditions designed not to respect personal security and privacy, but rather to elicit prompt answers from completely intimidated workers." 70 While the majority claimed that the environment was not coercive, the dissent believed that in light of the facts of the case, nobody would actually "have the temerity to believe that he was at liberty to refuse to answer their questions and walk away." 71 Instead of honestly and objectively looking at the actual circumstances under which the search occurred, the dissent claimed that the majority used a "sleight of hand., 72 Marshall and Brennan believed that the Court's decision was skewed to support the needs of the INS, and the constitutional rights of private citizens were sacrificed in the process. 73 
C. BRIGHT-LINE RULES IN CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
In the arena of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has continually stressed that a search's reasonableness is "measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances., 74 A bright-line, per se rule requiring police to notify citizens of their right to refuse has been considered unrealistic 75 and unnecessary. 76 As the Royer Court stated, "[T]here will be endless variations in the facts and circumstances.... [I] t is unlikely that the courts can reduce to a sentence or a paragraph a rule that will provide unarguable answers to the question [of] whether there has been an unreasonable search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, courts make their determinations based on their assessments of the circumstances in each case. 8 However, in the Fifth Amendment context, the totality-ofcircumstances test was rejected after years of use as the mandatory standard. 79 The Fifth Amendment protects citizens against selfincrimination, and requires that any confessions be voluntarily and knowingly made. s° In that situation, the Court came to hold that the totality-of-circumstances test was an insufficient measure of voluntariness, UNITED STA TES v. DRAYTON because "assessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed . . .can never be more than speculation." 8 ' Prior to 1966, courts "evaluated the admissibility of a suspect's confession under a voluntariness test,, 82 and courts held that whether a confession "was obtained by coercion or improper inducement can be determined only by an examination of all the attendant circumstances., 83 An evaluation based on the totality-of-circumstances was held to be deficient in Miranda. 84 Because of the "police-dominated atmosphere ' 8 5 in which such confessions were drawn out, the Court expressed worry that there had been an "abdication of the constitutional privilege" against selfincrimination. 86 Fear that "the compelling atmosphere of the in-custody interrogation, and not an independent decision on his part, caused the defendant to speak" had increased. 87 As a result, the Court determined that a totality-of-circumstances test may not always sufficiently reveal such coercion. 88 Therefore, the Court decided to change the method used to assess the validity of confessions, declaring that "in order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights .
, As the war on drugs has reached new heights, police have had to develop new tactics to combat the problem. 95 One such tactic has been drug-interdiction bus sweeps, where officers board buses and, after receiving passenger consent, conduct searches. 96 Such searches have been criticized as too coercive, and lower court decisions had been split on the constitutionality of such searches under the Fourth Amendment. 97 The Supreme Court addressed the issue in Florida v. Bostick. 98 Here, the Court reversed a decision by the Florida Supreme Court that held that such searches were per se unconstitutional, and found that drug-interdiction searches on buses are not always unconstitutional seizures. 99 The Court relied on the totality-of-circumstances test to make this decision. 00 However, in order to allow for such searches despite the cramped environment of a bus, the Court was forced to tweak the free-to-leave part of the test. 10 1 Because buses confine their passengers, and because the searches occur in unfamiliar places where passengers cannot simply walk away, a citizen really is not free to leave, as is required in all consensual searches according to Mendenhall. l 0 2 According to the Court in Bostick, however, the inability to walk away cannot be the deciding factor in determining the constitutionality of a search, because, like in Delgado, a citizen's confinement during a bus search was "the natural result of his decision to take the bus."' ' 0 3 To address this problem, the Court changed the standard; now, in bus searches, a court only must ask "whether a reasonable In assessing the specific situation in the Bostick case, the Court stressed two factors--"that the officers did not point guns at Bostick or otherwise threaten him and that they specifically advised Bostick that he could refuse consent." ' 5 Both of these factors were clear proof, according to the Court, that there was no message conveyed by the officers that "compliance with their requests [was] required." 10 6
After the Bostick decision, two federal cases out of Florida focused on one of these factors-the officer's advice that the passengers could refuse to consent-and began to set new standards which made bus searches more difficult to conduct. 10 7 In United State v. Guapi, the Eleventh Circuit held that when passengers are not told that they have the right to refuse to consent to the search, "the facts and circumstances of [a] search require some indication to passengers that their cooperation was voluntary .... ,, 108 According to this court, it is insufficient to simply avoid acting in a coercive manner; the officers must in fact "behave in a manner calculated to convey to a reasonable person that cooperation with law enforcement is voluntary." ' 0 9 While notification may not be required, it is "the most efficient and effective method to ensure compliance with the Constitution," 1 0 and therefore should always be used. The court concluded that the specific conduct of the officers in the Guapi bus search, combined with the cramped confines of the bus, was "carefully designed to convince passengers that they had no choice but to accede to" the officer's requests. 1 1 ' Therefore, the evidence collected in that search had to be suppressed.' 2 A second Florida case, decided just a few months after Guapi, placed even more emphasis upon the importance of an officer specifically 104 Id. ... Id. at 1394-97. This conduct included: 1) a general announcement made "very quickly" by an officer which asked for the passengers "consent and cooperation," id. at 1396; 2) the officer standing in front of the person he was questioning, id.; and 3) the statement of the bus driver, who had seen many of these searches, that he did not think the passengers had the right to avoid the search. ld. at 1396-97.
informing passengers of their right not to consent to the search. 13 The Court stated that an officer holding up a police badge was a "show of authority" sufficient to establish a seizure, and that "[a]bsent some positive indication that they were free not to cooperate, it is doubtful a passenger would think he or she had the choice to ignore the police presence." ' 14 This court stressed that explicit warnings were the only way for the police to "genuinely . . . ensure that their encounters with bus passengers remain absolutely voluntary."
The Washington and Guapi decisions impacted other circuits in differing ways.' l 6 The Ninth Circuit followed the Eleventh Circuit's lead and held that a bus search was unconstitutional even when an officer announced that "no one is under arrest, and you are free to leave. However, we would like to talk to you.' '7 Such an announcement, according to the court, made the passengers believe that they could either get off the bus or consent to the search, but that they could not simply stay on the bus and refuse to answer the officers' questions." 8 This alone was coercive and misleading enough to make the situation unconstitutional. 1 9 The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand, felt that the Washington decision created "a per se rule that authorities must notify bus passengers of the right to refuse consent before questioning those passengers."'
120
This court rejected such a bright-line rule as inconsistent with Bostick, and instead demanded that a totality-of-circumstances analysis be applied in bus search cases.'21 "3 United States v. Washington, 151 F.3d 1354, 1356 (lth Cir. 1998). Here, a bus search was unconstitutionally coercive when: 1) the officers were casually dressed with guns in fanny packs; 2) one officer made an announcement while holding up his badge, asking the passengers to show them their bus ticket and photo identification and to identify their luggage; and 3) the officers began their questioning from the back of the bus, to avoid blocking the aisles. 120 Broomfield, 201 F.3d at 1275. 121 Id at 1274. However, this court did agree with the Guapi decision, and felt that the circumstances surrounding that bus search "understandably warranted a finding of coercion."
Id.

III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 4, 1999, a Greyhound bus en route from Fort Lauderdale, Florida to Detroit, Michigan made a routine bus stop in Tallahassee, Florida.
22
Three officers from the Tallahassee Police Department's ("TPD") Drug Interdiction Team, Lang, Blackburn and Hoover, were at the bus station. 23 These officers routinely performed bus searches at this station, boarding buses coming in from Southern Florida to search out drugs and weapons. 24 TPD officers have "conducted such searches for three years, up to six or seven buses a day, four or five days a week."' 12 5 A low estimate would be that the officers had searched over 78,000 bus passengers during that period. 1 26 During this particular stop, all the passengers exited the bus so that it could be cleaned and refueled. 27 When this was finished, the passengers reboarded the bus, giving their tickets to the driver as they entered. 28 Once all the passengers were back on the bus, about five minutes before the scheduled departure time, the three TPD officers got permission from the driver and boarded the bus.'
29
The driver went into the terminal to complete some paperwork, and was not present during the search that followed. 3°T he three officers were "dressed casually and their badges were either hanging around their necks or held in their hands."' 3 ' They each had a set of handcuffs and a gun, which were kept inside holsters and concealed under draped shirts.' 32 After boarding, and without any sort of general announcement, Officers Lang and Blackburn immediately walked to the back of the bus. 133 Officer Hoover stayed at the front of the bus and knelt on the bus driver's seat, facing the rear of the bus in order to watch the passengers as they were searched. 134 The two Respondents, Drayton and Brown, were seated on the driver's side of the bus; Drayton was seated on the aisle and Brown was at the window seat.' 38 When Lang reached them, he bent over Drayton's shoulder from behind, "held up his badge long enough for the defendants to see that he was a police officer and, with his face 12-18 inches away from Drayton's face ... spoke in a voice just loud enough for the defendants to hear."' However, at this point Lang noticed that the men were wearing "heavy jackets and baggy pants.' 4 4 He became suspicious because he knew from experience that "drug traffickers often use baggy clothing to conceal weapons or narcotics.' ' 45 Therefore, Lang asked Brown if he could "pat him down for weapons." 46 Brown replied, "Sure," pulled a cell phone from his pocket and opened his jacket. 47 Lang patted down Brown's jacket and waist area, and then "proceeded to check his groin area and touched an unknown object in that area.'
148 Because Lang recognized the hard objects In response, Drayton simply raised "his hands about eight inches from his legs." ' 51 Lang did a similar pat-down search, and detected the same hard objects that he felt on Brown.1 52 Drayton was also arrested, and taken off the bus.' 53 While on the bus, neither man was informed that they had the "right to refuse to cooperate."' ' 54 Once off the bus, the two men were read their Miranda rights. 155 Lang then "unbuttoned their trousers and found plastic bundles of powder cocaine duct-taped between several pairs of boxer shorts."' 56 Drayton possessed 295 grams of cocaine, and Brown had 483 grams of cocaine. Based on this evidence, both men were charged with violating 21 U.S.C. § § 841(a)(1) and 846, for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and possessing cocaine with intent to distribute it.157 At trial, the defendants brought motions to suppress the evidence collected during the search.'
58 Each claimed that their consent to the patdown search was coerced and involuntary. 59 Therefore, they asserted, the search violated their Fourth Amendment rights. 60 The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida denied the defendants' motions. 161 After hearing only Lang testify, the Court held that " [e] verything that took place between Officer Lang and Mr. Drayton and Mr. Brown suggests that it was cooperative. There was nothing coercive, there was nothing confrontational about it." '1 62 Based on the evidence found on them during the bus search, Drayton and Brown were both convicted. 163 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the trial court's conviction of the defendants and remanded the case to the district court, with instructions to grant the defendants' motions to suppress. 164 Relying on Washington, the court found that "these defendants' consent was not sufficiently free of coercion to serve as a valid basis for a search."' ' 65 The facts of this case, the court held, were so similar to those in Washington as to control this decision.1 66 Because the bus search in Washington was held to violate the Fourth Amendment, this search was unconstitutional as well. 67 The Court of Appeals relied upon the precedent of Washington despite the existence of a few differences between the two cases. The rest of the decision was devoted to explaining why these differences were not "material."' ' 68 First, by displaying his badge, leaning in closely, and explaining to the defendants that he was conducting a search, Lang presented "a specific show of authority passenger-by-passenger," which was just as coercive as a general announcement like the one used in Washington.1 69 Second, the fact that Lang did not ask for any sort of documentation before conducting the search, as the officers in Washington had, was simply not significant to the court.' 70 Third, Lang's testimony that "during the past year five to seven people had declined to have their luggage searched," was not considered persuasive because "Lang did not testify that the statements the officers made and the methods they used in the searches where passengers declined to give consent or exited the bus were the same as in this case."' 7 ' Furthermore, considering the number of buses Lang searched in that year, the "six or seven refusals out of hundreds of requests is not very many.' 7 The last factor which differentiated Washington from the current case was that, in Washington, there was no officer positioned at the front of the bus, as Hoover was positioned during the Drayton search. The Eleventh Circuit felt that the officer's presence in that position "might make a reasonable person feel less free to leave the bus," exacerbating the coerciveness of the situation. Rejecting the standard established in Washington and Guapi, which required some positive show by the officers indicating that consent was not required, the Court determined that searches are acceptable as long as officers do not give passengers any "reason to believe that they were required to answer the officers' questions.' 179 After detailing the facts of the case, Kennedy began his discussion with an overview of the limits of Fourth Amendment protections, 80 stressing that even without any suspicion, law enforcement officials have the right to approach any citizen, and ask them questions or for consent to search their belongings.' 8 ' As long as the citizen is not coerced into complying with the officers' questions or requests, and can "terminate the encounter," there has been no unconstitutional action by the police.' 82 Kennedy also explained the special totality-of-circumstances test for bus searches established in Bostick, which does not rely on whether a 88 Kennedy demanded that an unbiased totality-of-circumstances test be applied to the facts of the case. 1 89 Based on this test, there was insufficient proof that the defendants in the Drayton case were forced by the officers to comply.' 90 In fact, there were no factors that should have given the defendants the impression that they could not refuse to cooperate. The officers did not display their weapons, left the aisle clear, and spoke to the passengers individually "in a polite, quiet voice. ' 91 According to the Court, this search was even less intimidating than a similar encounter occurring on a street; here, because there were "many fellow passengers... present to witness officers' conduct, a reasonable person may feel even more secure in his or her decision not to cooperate with police on a bus than in other circumstances."' ' 92 The decision discounted the three factors which the Respondents argued had made the search coercive. 1 93 Lang's display of his badge to the two men was not an adequate show of authority to create a seizure, 194 and the officers were neither wearing uniforms, nor brandishing their weapons, which would have been more compelling shows of authority. 95 Hoover's position in the driver's seat at the front of the bus was not persuasive 97 The last factor, that so few passengers had refused to cooperate in the past, was unimportant since the Court assumed that most people comply because they "know that their participation enhances their own safety and the safety of those around them."'1 98 According to Kennedy, it is impossible to conclude that compliance is coerced simply from the fact that most people do cooperate with the officers. 1 99 After determining that the passengers on the bus had not been seized, Kennedy also stated that the two men's consent to the search was voluntary. 2 00 Lang had asked permission from both men before beginning any search, and "[n]othing Officer Lang said indicated a command to consent to the search., 20 ' Even after Brown was arrested, Drayton still could have refused to comply, since "the arrest of one person does not mean that everyone around him has been seized by the police., 20 2 Drayton voluntarily chose to cooperate. 20 3 B. DISSENTING OPINION Justice Souter 20 4 disagreed with the majority's belief that the circumstances surrounding the bus search did not amount to a seizure. 2°5 Like the majority, he did not believe that it is always necessary to warn passengers that they can refuse to be questioned. 20 6 However, "the facts here surely required more from the officers than a quiet tone of voice." 20 7 Souter compared this situation to the questioning of a pedestrian on the street. 2 08 A perfectly constitutional interaction occurs when a single officer simply "goes up to a pedestrian on the street and asks him a question. 20 9 However, a very different situation arises when such questioning occurs in a narrow alley, with "three officers, one of whom stands behind the pedestrian, another at [the citizen's] side toward the open sidewalk, with the third addressing questions to the pedestrian a foot or two from his face." 210 In the first situation the citizen likely felt that he could walk away, while in the second, "the imbalance of immediate power is unmistakable." 211 This imbalance, "even in the absence of explicit commands or the formalities of detention," can be sufficient to "overbear a normal person's ability to act freely," therefore constituting an unconstitutional seizure. 212 Souter drew a parallel between the second example and the search at issue in Drayton. 21 3 In both cases, the officers completely control the environment. 2 14 Like in the alleyway, the three officers basically made certain that the bus's exit could easily be blocked. 215 The narrow aisles meant that Lang addressed the passengers "at very close range," and, because the overhead rack made it impossible for passengers to stand up straight, "[d]uring the exchanges, the officers looked down, and the passengers had to look up if they were to face the police. ' 216 The authority of these officers also seemed to supersede the driver's; the bus driver "yielded his custody of the bus and its seated travelers to three police officers" and, with possession of the passengers' tickets, waited in the bus station while the search was conducted. 2t 7 Furthermore, rather than asking for the passengers' permission to conduct the search, the officers merely displayed their badges, and stated that they were conducting the search and "'would ... like cooperation.' 21 8 This statement made cooperation seem 219 to be a preference rather than a requirement.
Such circumstances, to Souter, established an "atmosphere of obligatory participation. 220 Only an "uncomprehending" passenger would believe that "he stood to lose nothing if he refused to cooperate with the police, or that he had any free choice to ignore the police altogether. ' " 22 ' Instead, as each passenger was questioned, he was "conscious of an officer in front watching, one at his side questioning him, and one behind for cover, in case he became unruly, perhaps, or 'cooperation' was not forthcoming., 222 And the fact that passengers had refused to be searched in the past was insignificant, since the circumstances surrounding those instances were unknown and may have been very different from the situation at hand. 223 Souter also distinguished bus searches from the type of search conducted in Delgado. 224 In Delgado, even as the search was being conducted, the employees could continue to perform their normal workday business. 225 Conversely, because of the officers' search of the bus, "the customary course of events was stopped flat., 2 26 With the bus stopped, and the driver not even present, "it was reasonable to suppose no passenger would tend to his own business until the officers were ready to let him., 227 
V. ANALYSIS
The totality-of-circumstances test does not adequately protect citizens' rights in the context of bus searches. The Supreme Court has failed to provide consistent guidance on what police conduct is unacceptable, and there is simply no consensus among lower courts on which actions constitute coercion and which are acceptable. The totality-of-circumstances test has not been uniformly applied, and inconsistent and disputed decisions will continue to be handed down without a change in the standard used to measure coerciveness.
Bus searches are more similar to custodial interrogations than to general consensual searches, and possess the same weaknesses which forced the Court to create the Miranda warning.228 A similar bright-line warning is necessary in this situation.
229 A clear-cut standard is easier for 221 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting The main distinction between the two amendments is the location of the questioning; while Fifth Amendment questioning occurs when a suspect is in custody, searches performed within the Fourth Amendment scope are done in non-custodial contexts. 234 However, several factors distinguish bus searches from other Fourth Amendment consensual searches, and align bus searches closely with custodial interrogations. 235 Since the Miranda Court's holding was extended to every situation where a citizen is "deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning," the protections created for those situations should also cover bus searches. 2 36 The basic distinction between custodial and non-custodial interrogations is simply location. 23 7 Generally, Fourth Amendment searches occur with "'police officers visiting the house or place of business of the suspect and there questioning him, probably in the presence of a relation or friend.' ' 238 In such an environment, a person "is more keenly aware of his rights and more reluctant" to cooperate with the officers.
Conversely, custodial interrogations normally take place in unfamiliar places, where the suspect is isolated. 240 Experience has shown that in this strange environment citizens are less likely to "be confident, indignant, or recalcitrant," and police are given the "psychological advantage."
1
Bus searches are more similar to custodial interrogations. 24 2 The passenger is "confronted by the police outside of his 'own familiar territory,"' and "cannot simply leave the scene and repair to a safe haven to avoid unwanted probing." 243 This gives officers the same psychological advantages as in a custodial interrogation. 2 44 Along with the general location of the questioning, the type of space in which the questioning occurs during a bus search is similar to the space in a custodial interrogation. 24 5 According to the Supreme Court in Miranda, whenever a person is "deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way," a custodial environment is created. 4 6 In Royer, a situation where a man was confronted by two officers within a "small enclosed area" was considered "an almost classic definition of imprisonment. ' " 247 This is contrasted with Fourth Amendment searches, which occur in places where the person can get up and walk away, and which "result in considerably less inconvenience for the subject of the search. 248 Passengers during a bus search do not have the opportunity to walk away from the scene; doing so would lead to the risk of "being stranded" in an unfamiliar place. 249 The passengers are enclosed in the bus, surrounded by police officers who are watching their every move. 250 And since the bus drivers are usually absent until the search is over, the passengers cannot go on with their daily lives. 251 A third factor the Supreme Court uses to compare custodial and noncustodial investigations is the organization of the search. 3 Custodial interrogations occur in structured environments completely controlled by the officers. 254 In that environment, uniform guidelines are easier for officers to follow. 255 Consensual interactions between police and citizens generally "develop quickly," and occur "under informal and unstructured conditions. 256 Therefore, to demand that officers follow set procedures under these conditions is unrealistic.
Interdictions occurring on buses are like the custodial interrogations in that they are more invariable. Bus searches are usually part of a police program, and are routinely performed over long periods of time. 257 At the time of the respondent's arrest, the officers in the Drayton case had conducted these routine searches at the Tallahassee bus station four or five days every week for three years, searching up to seven buses a day. 258 Also, most officers conducting such searches are required to abide by strict written guidelines. 25 9 In fact, officers already almost always have a set announcement which they make to passengers after boarding the bus. 26°G iven such structure, it would be easy for officers to add a sentence to their requisite announcement, clearly stating that the passengers have a right to refuse to consent to the search. 26 ' 253 See, e.g., id at 197 (The officers boarded the bus as part of a "routine drug and weapons interdiction effort."). 254 260 After all, the officers must make an announcement when requesting to search the bus passengers. See, e.g., Bostick, 501 U.S. at 441 (noting that part of the routine of the searching officers was to "identify themselves and announce their purpose"). 261 Brief of Respondents at 9, Drayton (No. 01-631). Officer Lang admitted that "advising passengers of their right to refuse takes 'only three to five seconds' and imposes no 'additional burden' on him." Id.
B. COURTS CURRENTLY DO NOT USE AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD WHEN APPLYING THE TOTALITY-OF-CIRCUMSTANCES TEST TO A SITUATION
During the oral argument of the Drayton case, one justice stated that "an objective consideration [is] of the highest importance," when applying the totality-of-circumstances test to a situation. 262 "Objective" is defined as "of, relating to, or based on externally verifiable phenomena, as opposed to an individual's perceptions, feelings, or intentions. 263 In consensual search cases, by looking to "a reasonable man's interpretation of the conduct," judges believe that they are separating out their own beliefs. 264 This standard, ideally, is "flexible enough to be applied to the whole range of police conduct in an equally broad range of settings, [even while] it calls for consistent application from one police encounter to the next, regardless of the particular individual's response to the actions of the police., 265 Certain factors have been declared per se coercive, including "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled., 266 Cir. 1990 ) (noting that bus searches are not unconstitutional, and since a bus passenger "voluntarily placed himself in tight quarters," this should not be important); United States v. Flowers, 912 F.2d 707, 711 (4th Cir. 1990) (explaining that because a consensual search occurred on a bus does not "automatically transform it into a seizure").
The Supreme Court attempted to clear up such discrepancies in Bostick. 27°I nstead, the Court only managed to further complicate the totality-ofcircumstances test; disagreements among the justices persisted even within the decision itself. 27 ' The Supreme Court majority did not agree that the factors that had swayed the State Supreme Court's decision to hold bus searches unreasonably coercive were important. 272 Those factors, including the passengers' confinement and the unfamiliar environment, were secondary to other aspects of the search which upheld the actions of the police. 273 The Supreme Court felt that two different factors were "particularly worth noting:" that the police informed Bostick of his "right to refuse consent," and that the officers never threatened Bostick with a gun. 274 Because of these factors, the majority did not believe that that the officers could have conveyed "a message that compliance with their requests is required., 27 5 Conversely, the three dissenters found that the facts of this particular search "exhibit[ed] all of the elements of coercion associated with a typical bus sweep." 276 They could not "understand how the majority [could] possibly suggest" that passengers would feel free to refuse to comply with the officers' requests. 277 Where the majority held that the location of the search is only of minimal importance, the dissent agreed with the State Supreme Court that the cramped confines and unfamiliar location of the search strongly "aggravates the coercive quality of such an encounter., 278 Also, while the majority felt that there was no real show of authority because the officers did not wield a gun, the dissent felt that the officers' display of their badges, their "bright green 'raid' jackets bearing the insignia of the Broward County Sheriffs Department," and the fact that one officer "held a gun in a recognizable weapons pouch" were sufficient grounds for declaring the conduct "an intimidating 'show of authority.' 279 The predictable result of such a split decision at the highest level has led to more disagreement in the lower courts. 280 In Washington, the Eleventh Circuit majority held that the bus search at issue "was consciously designed to take full advantage of a coercive environment, 281 while the dissent concluded that this search was reasonable. 282 The policeman's conduct was an impermissible and coercive 'show of authority' when he "held his badge above his head and identified himself as a federal agent... [and] announced what he wanted the passengers to do, and what he was going to do. 283 Yet the dissenter felt that the reasonable man would not have been intimidated because during the search the officers were not in uniform. 2 84 Also, he believed the search would not have intimidated people because there was no officer standing at the front of the bus, and the officers left the aisles open while they questioned the passengers. 285 In Guapi, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision and found the officers' conduct impermissible, despite conceding that, as the District Court found, the officers "did not touch or grab Defendant, block his path of regress, or retain something of value from him., 286 Because the officers began questioning at the front of the bus, an officer stayed in the driver's seat throughout the search, and no warning was given, the permissible actions that the District Court stressed meant little. 287 Even Drayton, the Court's most recent attempt to clarify the test, simply resulted in more irreconcilably different interpretations of the coerciveness of a search. 2 88 The justices disagreed on the threshold at which a reasonable person would become intimidated. 289 The majority of the Supreme Court disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit's holding that reasonable people would have felt obliged to consent during the bus search. 290 The passengers would not be intimidated since Lang "did not brandish a weapon or make any intimidating movements. He left the aisle free so that respondents could exit. He spoke to passengers one-by-one and in a polite, quiet voice., 29 1 The presence of Hoover at the front of the bus 289 The majority held that "the officers gave the passengers no reason to believe that they were required to answer the officers' questions," id. at 203, while the dissent held that the officers' actions made clear that "cooperation is expected." Id. at 212 (Souter, J., dissenting). was unimportant because the officer "did nothing to intimidate passengers, and he said nothing to suggest that people could not exit. ' 292 The display of the badge should have "little weight in the analysis," since such marks of authority are meant to provide "assurance, not discomfort." 293 Also, the simple fact that the officers were armed, is "unlikely to contribute to the coerciveness of the encounter," according to the majority, because passengers would only be scared if the gun was actually brandished. 294 The dissent found that these same actions were sufficient to constitute coerciveness, arguing that police conduct "may overbear a normal person's ability to act freely, even in the absence of explicit commands or the formalities of detention." 295 According to Souter, the majority was not being rational and, by combining all the "relevant facts" of the case, it was clear that "an atmosphere of obligatory participation was established., 296 The factors contributing to this interpretation included the display of badges; Hoover's positioning by the exit; the questioning of passengers at close range; the cramped quarters of the bus; the absence of the bus driver with the passengers' tickets; the initial announcement's phrasing, commanding that the officers "would like . . . cooperation" rather than asking for cooperation; and the delay of travel while the search was being conducted. 297 These dissenting justices felt that the officer's polite tone of voice would not comfort the reasonable person because "a police officer who is certain to get his way has no need to shout., 298 Also, individual questioning which began with "Do you mind .
," meant little after the scene of "obligatory participation" had already been set. 299 The conclusion of Justice Souter's dissent clearly displays how evaluations of a situation are based on individual perceptions of the circumstances. 300 Expressing his incredulity at the majority's holding, he writes that it is obvious that "the majority cannot see what [the dissent 292 Id. at 205. 293 Id. at 204. In the transcript of the oral arguments, there was some discussion over how Hoover's position may be intimidating. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Drayton (No. 01-631).
... Drayton, 536 U.S. at 205. However, the Court does admit that most people on the bus probably knew that the officers were armed, since "everybody knows" that officers are always armed when on duty. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7-8, Drayton (No. 01-631).
... Drayton, 536 U.S. at 210 (Souter, J., dissenting). The totality-of-circumstances test used in consensual search cases does not take into account the individual characteristics or knowledge of the person giving the consent. Court to shift part of the Government's burden; the prosecutor no longer has to prove that the citizen understood that the search was voluntary. 3 2 However, such an assumption also "ignores the demographic realities of the reasonable bus passenger." 31 3 People who travel by bus are generally less educated than the average citizen, and know less about their Constitutional rights. 314 But the static "reasonable person" standard does not take this ignorance into account, and "places the burden of knowing one's right to refuse consent squarely on individual citizens-not law enforcement. 315 As a result, those with less knowledge, like the average bus passenger, are punished because of their ignorance.
The Miranda Court realized the weakness of making assumptions based upon a reasonable person standard. 317 There, the Court described citizens who do not understand their constitutional rights as "helpless," and held that they should not be penalized for that ignorance. 318 The Court also recognized that any "reasonable person" assumption will always "favor the defendant whose sophistication or status had fortuitously prompted him" to know how to respond to the situation at hand. 319 Therefore, the Court chose to use a standard that assumes that no one knows their rights. 320 A warning, the only "ascertainable assurance that the accused was aware of [his] right," became mandatory in every case. 32 ' If the Court condemns such assumptions in custodial interrogations, it seems wrong to then rely on these same assumptions as a shortcut in search and seizure cases.
322
A second factor that is generally not taken into consideration by courts is the wording of the questions that police ask the passengers. 3 23 Though subtle, this factor can greatly influence the direction that a search may take. 324 No matter how the passenger responds, the officer can always claim a good faith belief that the passenger had consented to the search.
329
By being advised of their rights at the beginning of the investigation, the bus passengers may prepare themselves to withhold consent to the search, despite how the officers phrase their individual requests for permission. 330 They are not put on the spot as much. 331 Also, because the warning acknowledges the passengers' rights, these people can be more assured that the officers are "prepared to recognize" their right to refuse consent and will not bully them into complying. 332 The third factor which should be considered is the psychological pressures exerted on the passengers during these bus searches. 333 Courts do not adequately consider the data which psychological studies have uncovered: "police-initiated encounters and attendant search requests conducted in the close confines of a bus engender psychological pressures on passengers to comply and can result in grants of consent to search that are not voluntarily given, but are in fact the product of police coercion." 334 Several studies have demonstrated that people do not always respond rationally to the demands of authority figures.
33 5 One study, conducted by Leonard Bickman, determined that symbols of authority can hugely impact a person's conduct. 336 Based on people's recognition of certain uniforms, Bickman found that authority figures perceived to be high on the social hierarchy were able to exert a lot of control over people. 337 This power is rooted, Bickman believes, in Americans' learned belief that such agents are meant to help society; any demands they make must serve some beneficial purpose and should be followed. 338 A second well-known study illustrated what occurs when such an authority figure makes unreasonable or illogical demands on a person. 339 Stanley Milgram found that a person is more likely to follow the demands of a legitimate authority figure than he is to follow his own internal system of beliefs, even when the two are incompatible. 34°I n bus searches, the officers' symbols of authority, including their uniforms and badges, are signs to the passengers of the officers' authority, and reminders that these police have ultimate control over the situation. 3 4 ' Furthermore, the bus driver's deference to the officers, leaving them to control the bus, reflects the police's power. 342 The officers have the ability to control the movements of the bus and the movements of the passengers. 343 The result of such authority is an obviously "marked who was told to ask a 'learner' a variety of questions. Whenever the learner (who was a confederate of the experimenter) answered a question wrong, the teacher was commanded to administer an electric shock to the learner. As the learner audibly expressed increasing discomfort at the shocks, the experimenter used verbal prods to encourage the teacher to continue the test. Milgram measured "the point at which the teacher's moral resolve exceeded the pressure of obedience." Sixty-five percent of the teachers proceeded to shock the learner up to the maximum voltage level. The confined environment also has a psychological impact on the passengers. 34 6 While the Court held that the confinement during a bus search is minimal, since the passengers chose to confine themselves, 34 7 a person's comfort in a certain environment has been found only to extend to the actions that the person had intended to take in that space. 348 In the case of a bus passenger, the intended use of the space is to travel; once the space changes into an interrogation room, the sense of confinement also must be adjusted. 349 In terms of the actual questioning, the Court does not consider how the close confines affect a person's responses to the actual questioning.
350 When speaking to Drayton, Officer Lang's face was only twelve to eighteen inches away from Drayton's face. 35 ' The eighteen inches around a person are considered intimate space; studies have shown that an invasion of that space results in "emotional distress, physiological reactions, and . ..loss of control.
352 Thus, such close proximity is an invasion of personal space, and likely affected Drayton's response to the situation. 353 Brief warnings can help minimize the "instinctive reaction to the police officer's perceived legitimacy.
Such a warning would counter the reflexive obedience most citizens have towards authority figures, by "dispelling the socially-engineered belief' that one cannot disobey a law enforcement official. 355 Even a citizen who knows his rights abstractly may find that, when confronted in the actual situation, he does not have the capacity to stand up to the authority figure.
35 6 When that figure begins the interaction by reminding the citizen of his rights, it strengthens the person's ability to stand up to the figure and actually exercise this right. 3 57 Later intimidation, like the close face-to-face questioning, therefore can be responded to more rationally.
D. A BRIGHT-LINE RULE WILL NOT DRAMATICALLY HINDER THE SUCCESS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENTS.
Bus searches performed without warnings "are undoubtedly successful in ferreting out some unspecified amount of drugs and thus removing such material from the street., 359 Therefore, a main hindrance to the passage of a bright-line warning requirement is the fear that such a warning would seriously hinder the success rate of these searches in seeking out illegal drugs and weapons. 360 The actual impact, though, may be minimal. Citizens choose to consent to searches for a variety of reasons, only one of which is coercion. 361 Innocent passengers, with nothing to hide, will not be affected by the warning, and may consent simply to prove their innocence. 362 Guilty suspects may have reason to still consent, despite knowing their rights. 363 Many suspects, like Drayton and Brown, attempt to conceal their drugs and think that they can convince the officers of their innocence by consenting to the search.
3 64 These people would allow a search in spite of the warning. 365 Others may not realize that they have something that is illegal, or may not think that whatever they have is serious enough to have any dramatic consequences. 366 The warning will not let all guilty people "get away with it," but will guarantee that when people do consent, they do not do so because of ignorance. 3 67 The notice gives people knowledge of the options that they have; what people choose to do with that knowledge is up to them. 368 Officers also will not suddenly be struck helpless by such a requirement. 369 Despite the risk that they cannot immediately search a suspicious subject, officers can continue to pursue the suspect until they have sufficient probable cause for a search warrant. 370 Also, if officers are so suspicious of a passenger that they believe they need to immediately search the person, they likely have sufficient reasonable suspicion to perform a Terry frisk. 3 71 A second problem associated with the warning is the fear that such mandatory procedures may "greatly increase the administrative and operational burden of screening and interacting with passengers." 372 However, these additional problems are mere speculation, and must be contrasted against the resources currently used by courts in trying to objectively collect and analyze the facts of each situation when applying the totality-of-circumstances test. 373 As discussed above, recent cases keep rising to appellate courts, and no consistent guidelines have been established for determining when situations are coercive. 374 The confusion and inconsistency of the current system is a greater burden than an additional sentence at the beginning of each search. 375 After all, courts already encourage the use of warnings as much as possible, and these warnings are encouraged in police manuals and handbooks. 376 A warning is not a novel or outrageous idea, but is one that is known to work 377 and simple to implement. 378 
VI. CONCLUSION
Blocking the Eleventh Circuit's attempts to implement a per se rule, the Court in Drayton held that verbal announcements to bus passengers that notify them of their constitutional right to refuse to be searched, were not mandatory. 379 The United States Supreme Court held that as long as officers do not give the passengers any reason to believe that their compliance is required, a search done with the person's consent is constitutional. 380 To determine whether officers acted in a manner which 371 For example, in Drayton, after Brown was arrested, officers may have had sufficient reasonable suspicion to frisk Drayton even if he had not consented to the search. United States v. Drayton, 536 U. S. 194, 207 (2002) . unreasonably intimidated the bus passengers, courts must use a totality-ofcircumstances test. 38 " ' Judges must look at the factors involved in each specific situation to decide whether the passengers on the bus would feel that they could freely decline to answer the officers' questions without any fear of repercussions.
382
The totality-of-circumstances test is ineffective, inconsistently applied, and flawed. A bright-line rule which requires officers to tell bus passengers of their right to refuse to consent should be implemented. 383 Searches conducted on buses hold the same risks of coercion as custodial interrogations and therefore, just as the Miranda Court held a bright-line rule necessary to counter coercion in that setting, a bright-line rule is necessary for consensual bus searches. 384 The totality-of-circumstances test is not objectively or consistently applied by the courts, and certain important factors are not currently being taken into consideration by courts. 385 A bright-line rule would also clear up confusion by giving officers a clear statement on how to proceed in consensual bus searches and allowing courts to hand down consistent and clear decisions. The importance of protecting citizens' fundamental rights has become especially pressing in the wake of September 11, 2001.387 Americans are more worried about their safety than ever before, and new measures are being implemented to keep the public secure. 388 However, such security concerns do not give the Government the right to disregard the constitutional rights of American citizens; in fact, these are the liberties the United States claims to be fighting to protect. 389 In the Fourth Amendment arena, the Court has been trying to balance priorities. 390 And in cases such as Drayton, the Court has chosen to increase officers' ability to uncover illegal drugs and weapons at the cost of citizens' rights. 39 1 However, "no system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication through unawareness of their constitutional rights." 392 By adding a warning before conducting consensual bus searches, officers can still do their jobs, but without ignoring the rights of the individual citizen. 39 
